Art 4. Vol 3. 2026
By Bhumit Kumar Sancheti
Bhumit Kumar Sancheti is pursuing a Bachelor’s degree at Jadavpur University, currently in the fourth year of study, with a Sociology Major and International Relations Minor. He is keen about the indefiniteness of social sciences.
Bangladesh is found to be in a peculiar state where it is surrounded by two regional powers, i.e., India and China respectively. With the former, the ties are that of shared history, culture, geography and trauma. In the case of China, the non-interference in the domestic matters of Dhaka along with heavy material investment opportunities make it strategically central in geopolitical calculations (Anwar, 2019; Mahmud, 2026). Amid this, the water diplomacy around the Teesta River remains a topic of contention where the changing political landscape and reconfiguration of foreign policy have caused much upheaval among the trio (Mahmud, 2026). Before delving deep into the nuances of the paper – the oscillatory movement on Teesta, and the current developments surrounding it – let us glimpse the geography of Teesta, and causes of the regional rivalries over it.
The Teesta River is a tributary of the Brahmaputra, the latter originates in China by the name Tsangpo (Abbas, 2025). The Teesta River begins at Tso Lhamo Lake in north Sikkim, at an elevation of about 5,280 meters. It flows for approximately 150 km through Sikkim and then 123 kilometers (hereafter, km) in West Bengal, before entering Bangladesh at Mekhligunj in the Cooch Behar district. In Bangladesh, the river continues for another 140 km, eventually reaching the Bay of Bengal. Teesta is the fourth largest trans-boundary river in Bangladesh, and its floodplain covers an area of 2,750 square km in the country. While the majority of the river’s catchment area (83%) is located in India, the remaining 17% is in Bangladesh. This river supports 8.5% of Bangladesh’s population and contributes to 14% of its agricultural production (Singh, 2025). As per the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Bangladesh’s external dependency ration of water is over 90 percent, with a considerable amount coming from India (Mirchandani, 2016). It serves as an issue between the neighbours as 54 rivers cut across both India and Bangladesh, i.e., shared trans-boundary (Abbas, 2025; Singh, 2025). In 1972, an India-Bangladesh Joint River Commission was constituted to look after fair distribution of them. Till now, only one Ganga has been able to cross the mark. It took 25 years of negotiation to get to this rare feat in 1996 (Mostofa, 2023). The agreement is itself at the brink of expiry in 2026 (December) (Abbas, 2025). For Teesta, the issue is quite old, and is centred on multiple factors, especially Bangladesh being lower-riparian in this situation. The requirement of water for the irrigation of boro rice during the dry season for both sides, around 1800–2800 mm, is common. Bangladesh has complained repeatedly of lower flow of water, and it is true as to meet the continuous need for electricity in the urban areas of Jalpaiguri and Siliguri, and to maintain the expansive rice fields, water is being diverted from Gajoldoba via India through “the Teesta-Mahananda irrigation canal.” In addition, the hydroelectric projects in Sikkim too contributes to the irregularities (Ghosh, 2019). As Bhuiyan (2026) emphasizes, the northern Bangladesh is worst hit by the barrage diversion. Historically, the area has been less developed along the lines of industrialization, thus dependence on the primary sector remains inevitable:
People in the northern parts of Bangladesh have suffered for years from the dual jeopardy of drought and flooding in the Teesta Basin. … The human consequences have been profound. Thousands of families have been displaced over the years by riverbank erosion, creating recurring cycles of poverty, migration, and social insecurity. Communities dependent on agriculture already vulnerable to the effects of climate change remain trapped between extremes.
In the year 1983, an ad-hoc/temporary arrangement in reference to water sharing was initiated, allotting 36% of the share to Bangladesh and 39% to India (and the rest remaining unallocated), but it collapsed and never got translated into a permanent treaty (Ghosh 2019; Abbas 2025). In 1984, the JRC proposed a share of 42.5 % to India and 37.5 % to Bangladesh (Ghosh, 2019). Along similar lines, a 2011 agreement was proposed, but it was vetoed by then West Bengal Chief Minister, Mamata Banerjee (Tharoor, 2012; Ghosh, 2019; Abbas, 2025; Singh, 2025; Sinha 2025). The talks were prospering back then and were at the brink of signing between UPA II and the Bangladesh government (Tharoor, 2012; Singh, 2025), but Mamata Banerjee-led Trinamool Congress was a strong coalition partner back then of the ruling regime and her walk-off left a stalemate (Tharoor, 2012).
The void that this arrangement has created is still unresolved, and has been a test of patience for Dhaka. The gulf has been captured by Beijing. In 2024, China put forward a proposal to carry out the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project (hereafter, TRCMR) in Bangladesh with compliance to its estimated cost of $1 billion. In reaction to it, India’s then Foreign Secretary, Mr. Kwatra, visited and offered Bangladesh Indian funding for the concerned project (Mazumder, 2024). It was later during the official visit of, now ousted, Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina that India would send a technical team to look after the “conservation and management of the River.” Hasina later asserted, after her Chinese visit, that “she would give preference to India as the river originates from the country.” (Sinha, 2025).
Before, commenting on the post-Hasina scenario, let us look at why India is so keen on the Teesta issue. First of all, it is about its security concerns; any involvement of China in Teesta’s management invariably puts its closeness to the Siliguri corridor or “Chicken’s Neck” a concern. The narrow pathway is the only in-land connection between North-Eastern states and the rest of India, and China’s growing influence poses a further threat of India losing grip on its neighbour, i.e., reduction in dependency (Mazumder, 2024; Mahmud, 2026). In addition to that, Brahmaputra’s origin, as aforementioned, is in China, and it makes it upper-riparian to both India and Bangladesh. China’s current steps towards building hydropower strength has caused a lot of anxiety for both Delhi and Dhaka (Mahmud, 2026). Beijing can use it to flood the downstream areas during conflict, especially Arunachal Pradesh (Abbas, 2025). For Bangladesh too, China’s engagement in the Teesta and, at the same time, controlling the upstream water flow causes some discomfort (Mahmud, 2026). But nonetheless, China has, by no doubt, expanded its footprint throughout Bangladesh in recent years. “China is Bangladesh’s fourth-largest lender after Japan, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank, with total loans disbursed since 1975 amounting to USD 7.5 billion …” (“Bangladesh turns to China,” 2026). Bhuiyan (2026) stresses that this project for China aims at a wider goal of its Belt and Road Initiative’s (hereafter, BRI) expansion:
China’s involvement introduces an important geopolitical dimension to the project. Over the last decade, China has become one of Bangladesh’s largest development partners, investing heavily in roads, bridges, ports, energy, telecommunications, and industrial infrastructure under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Beijing’s interest in the Teesta River project stems from its broader strategic goal of connectivity and relationship-building in South Asia.
Nevertheless, the project in itself is vital for Dhaka. It aims at solving the age-old issues and the status quo faced by the inhabitants of North Bangladesh, aiming at constructing a “sustainable economic zone” outside of the Teesta basin. The current Bangladeshi PM, Tarique Rahman, has officially asked China for help with respect to TRCMR in May 2026. This became evident after Khalilur Rahman, Bangladesh’s Foreign Minister, met Wang Yi, his Chinese counterpart where the latter “reaffirmed Beijing’s readiness to align its Belt and Road Initiative with Bangladesh’s development agenda … The Power Construction Corporation of China is expected to submit a final master plan for the project by year’s end. India, by contrast, is still at the stage of proposing technical studies” (Siow, 2026). Khalilur, prior to his visit, asserted that ‘they cannot just wait for a water-sharing agreement to happen with India, as it was a matter of “life and death” for the populace living along the River Teesta’ (‘can’t wait on India,’ 2026).
The pivot is not just about the growing impatience, but also a translation of populist aspirations of the Bangladeshi populace, especially the growing anti-India sentiment there after India gave refuge to Sheikh Hasina. This was certainly more visible among the young people who were not nostalgic about 1971’s glory and India’s role in it (Mahmud, 2026). But amid these tensions and push and pull factors, a very interesting and recent (June 2026) statement by Shahiduddin Chowdhury Anee, Water Resources Minister, came to light. He said in an interview with Daily Star: “The government will construct the Padma Barrage and implement the Teesta Mega Plan with its own funds … It will require half the amount needed for the barrage. Why do we have to take it from China?” On the issue of renewing the Ganga Water Treaty, he went on to assert that friendly relations with India and “Technical teams from both Bangladesh and India are working on the renewal, with both sides maintaining constant communication.” (Roy, 2026). The statement heavily contradicts the propositions made by the Bangladesh government in May 2026. At one level, these may indicate a re-thinking or may be just political rhetoric. Nonetheless, there exists certain anomalies – with this or any other mega project, the concern of debt looms large. As Mahmud (2026) asserts, the centrality of China’s financing even exceeds the threat of a debt trap, as it carries the potential of losing “strategic neutrality.” Teesta project runs this risk. And proximity to India in terms of trade and regional transit and connectivity makes it a question of geographical essentialism. The geographical advantage of India and the speedy capital flow of China along with lesser conditions puts Dhaka in a tussle, especially when both Delhi and Beijing have inter-rivalries. The recent scenario with Sri Lanka’s debt, Nepal and the Maldives’ constant oscillations, exemplifies that maintenance of strategic autonomy while being tucked between two mammoths remains a challenge for smaller states. Shafi Md Mostofa, a security studies scholar, University of Dhaka, in his conversation with the South China Morning Post, asserted that “bringing Beijing into the picture was a way for Dhaka to shake Delhi out of its complacency”. He went to say that it should not be presented “as a geopolitical move”, as “If Bangladesh presents the project as a China-backed strategic move against India, then Delhi will react strongly … The best approach would be transparency, technical cooperation and keeping the project open enough so that India does not feel completely excluded,” (Siow, 2026).
Parashar (2026) emphasized that the recent change in regime in Bengal may also have fuelled up the recalibration of Bangladesh on the issue of the Teesta River. Mamata Banerjee’s long reign in West Bengal ended in the recent elections, and the Bharatiya Janata Party (hereafter, BJP) formed the new government in the state with a clean sweep. The presence of the same party at the state and centre may be seen as a positive development, and may yield the cooperation required at this point of uncertainty. Though, for any progress to happen, it is clear that the BJP needs to provisionally calm down its “hostile majoritarianism,” and the unprecedented rhetoric of nationalism on issues like “illegal immigration.” The not so good unfolding of relations after Sheik Hasina’s exile has been an issue of contention, especially the rise of Jamaat-e-Islami as the main opposition to the incumbent BNP. In addition, the presence of hardliners within BNP has also aided to the hardening of identity politics in Bangladesh, this with presence of a substantial Hindu minority made the domestic equation complicated on both the sides.
The unfolding of Indo-Bangladesh relations heavily depends on how swiftly the regional positions, domestic rhetoric, and distinctively common interests are negotiated in pursuance of the foreign policy away from rhetorical populism. I would like to conclude it short, and find Mahmud’s (2026) assertion sound that “Tarique Rahman inherits precisely such a moment: an India seeking reassurance, a China seeking opportunity and a Bangladeshi public increasingly unwilling to appear subordinate to either,” It is just that amid this political equation the implicit force remains the local populace and domestic politics, acting as stimuli to change. Their stance will inevitably shape the way Bangladesh will move in this struggle (and gain) for capital, geography and diplomacy.
References
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Anwar, A. (2019, July 12). How Bangladesh is Benefiting From the China-India Rivalry. The Diplomat.
Bangladesh Turns to China on Teesta Project, casting shadow on India’s Ties. (2026, May 7). The Economic Times.
‘Can’t wait on India to resolve Teesta issue,’ says foreign minister. (2026, May 5). The Financial Express.
Bhuiyan, S. A. (2026, May 18). Teesta project: A source of rivalry or cooperation. The Financial Express.
Ghosh, N. (2019). Why India has not been able to resolve the Teesta stalemate. Observer Research Foundation.
Mahmud, F. (2026, May 12). Tarique Rahman steps into South Asia’s hardest balancing act. The Frontline.
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